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WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA. By
Marylynn Salmon. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 267. $24.

Prior to the passage of the first married women's property acts in
the mid-nineteenth century, 1 single women enjoyed much the same
property rights as men,2 but "wives exercised only a truncated propri-

1. The first state to pass such an act was Mississippi in 1839. See Comment, Husband and
Wife: Mef!lorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REV. 1110 (1944).
2. 'Notable exceptions included women's inability to enjoy the franchise associated with property ownership in early America, to inherit equally with their brothers due to the law of primogeniture (observed in New York until 1774, in Virginia until 1785, in Maryland until 1786, and

1110

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:1109

etary capacity" (p. xv). Once married, women were no longer individuals with respect to the law. They could not institute legal actions,
enter into binding contracts, act as executors or administrators of estates or as legal guardians, or convey property without their husbands'
participation. 3 The common law sanctioned these activities only when
wives acted with their husbands. Conversely, men did not require
their wives' consent or participation for most transactions. Thus, in
many respects the legal relationship between husband and wife resembled that between guardian and incompetent.4
The married women's property acts removed many of these common law disabilities of married women. The acts generally provided
that married women shall have the same rights as single women to sue
and be sued, make contracts, and own and transfer property. 5 By thus
equalizing the property rights of married and single women, the acts
displaced the ancient legal fiction of unity of person, whereby a husband and wife were viewed as a special partnership in which the wife's
role was submissive (pp. 14-15). Those states that passed such acts at
last cleaved the married couple into individuals and recognized the
possibility of separate interests within a marriage.
Traditionally, historians have characterized the married women's
property acts as revolutionary, the products of profound economic
changes accompanying industrialization. 6 In Women and the Law of
Property in Early America, however, Marylynn Salmon7 moves beyond
this perspective and shows that the passage of these acts was evolutionary, not revolutionary. She also asserts that, while economic
forces may have dictated the need for legal reforms, ideological and
social forces - not economic ones - determined whether those reforms would spell increased autonomy for women or perpetuate their
dependence (p. 190).
From 1750 to 1830 an agonizingly slow and by no means uniform
expansion in married women's property rights is evident. Because this
expansion effectively foreshadows the more dramatic and substantive
gains embodied in the married women's property acts, Salmon chooses
to assess the legal status of married women during this period, explain
in South Carolina until 1791 (p. 142)), and, of course, to expand their property rights upon
marriage.
3. Under common Jaw, a husband was even held liable for his wife's torts. This rule was
based on the presumption that a wife acts under her husband's direction. See I. DUKEMINIER &
1. KRIER, PROPERTY 531 n.13 (1981).
4. Id. at 531.
5. C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 559,
644-47 (2d ed. 1983).
6. For a listing and brief discussion of studies representing the debate on the development of
women's property rights in colonial and early American society, see pp. xii-xvii nn.4-6.
7. Salmon is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore
County. The book is based on her Ph.D. thesis.
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regional variations in this status, and show that the ideological and
social forces which later resulted in passage of the married women's
property acts were rooted in late colonial and early national society.
Women and the Law of Property in Early America succeeds admirably in these aims. In part, this success is due to Salmon's methodology. By choosing seven colonies (later states) to represent a range of
social and economic characteristics of the period and by examining the
legal status of married women in each with respect to conveyances,
contracts, divorce and separation, separate estates, and provisions for
widows, Salmon claims to avoid the flaws of past studies. Past studies,
she asserts, have "suffered from a failure to cast the net widely
enough" and have resorted to "easy generalizations" (p. 185). By failing to look at a number of different colonies and states, these studies
give the mistaken impression that early America treated married
women uniformly and that the married women's property acts materialized suddenly from a nationwide consensus. Furthermore, by failing
to examine several types of property transactions, such studies may
also lead one to the erroneous conclusion that a given colony or state
can be easily characterized as either liberal or repressive in its treatment of women. With the appearance of Salmon's careful, extensively
footnoted analysis of statutes, case law, and writings of the period,
however, such misimpressions must now be put aside.
Salmon first discusses the vast regional variations in married
women's legal status. In Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania - the colonies Salmon chooses to exemplify the reform tradition - Puritan and Quaker legislators, having fled religious
persecution in England, were not enamored of English norms and distrusted the flexible modes of adjudication employed in English chancery courts. Thus, they were not at all reluctant to break with
England to create social and legal systems that exemplified their ideals. One such ideal, deeply rooted in both the Puritan and Quaker
ethoses, was that of family unity, which required the wife's submission
to her husband's will in all aspects of economic life. To strengthen the
family unit, therefore, lawmakers reduced the autonomy of married
women. In doing so, they were unconstrained by more liberal decisions emanating from English chancery courts or by any consideration
of whether the end of family unity justified the means of enforcing
women's submission.
To Salmon, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina represent
slave economies. Settled by adventurers and entrepreneurs rather than
by social experimenters and reformers, these colonies imitated English
social and legal norms in an attempt to preserve the self-esteem of
colonists who viewed the culture of the mother country as superior.
These colonies therefore lacked the ideological commitment to change
that characterized their Puritan and Quaker neighbors to the north.
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As a result, chancery jurisprudence was embraced and English precedents were followed, adapted only to the exigencies of the new world.
Finally, Salmon chooses to analyze New York, a colony that is
harder to classify. Founded by entrepreneurs and adventurers akin to
those who settled the South (p. 12), New York, like the southern colonies, had many laws which attempted to duplicate the common law
and equity systems of England. New York's economy, however, was
more like that of the New England colonies. Thus, despite the common English origin, New York law came to be distinct from the law of
the southern colonies due to its application and adaptation to a different economic reality.
Having first distinguished the social reformers in New England
and Pennsylvania from the England-gazing Southerners and New
Yorkers, Salmon then traces the development of laws on conveyancing. Under common law, upon marriage a husband acquired an estate
known as jure uxoris, which gave him the right to possession (including all rents and profits) of lands of which his wife was seised either
before or during the marriage. While the wife retained legal title to
this property, the rights embodied in the estatejure uxoris were alienable by the husband and subject to the reach of his creditors.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania all created conveyancing laws based on the assumption that family stability required the
wife to be submissive and that a husband's judgment would always be
exercised in the best interests of the family. Thus, the Puritans and
Quakers rejected such legal conventions as the bargain and sale deed
with a private examination as a method of conveying married women's
property. Under this mechanism, the wife was examined in private by
a judge to insure that her signature on a deed conveying her own lands
was knowingly given and free from coercion (pp. 17-18). This procedure, implying as it did the wife's autonomous decision regarding the
disposition of property, represented a threat to the Puritans' and
Quakers' concept of family harmony. The "reformers" thus invoked
the concept of unity of person to reduce this threat, but as Salmon
astutely notes, "Unity of person was based on the perfect marriage,
and therefore it inevitably created hardships in marriages that were
less than ideal" (p. 15). Thus, the reality of self-serving, coercive husbands was not recognized, and the damage they wreaked on their
wives' fortunes was left unchecked.
New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, on the other
hand, accepted the concept of separate interests within marriage and
admitted the strong possibility that a husband would coerce his wife to
assent to transactions involving her property. They thus tended to enforce private examinations. Salmon formulates two theories for this
difference (pp. 39-40). The Puritans and Quakers may have been progressive because they left it to women to protect their own interests,
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while the southern states were paternal because of their concern for
female helplessness. The alternate theory is that New York and the
southern states, by admitting the possibility of coercion and enforcing
private examinations, were the more enlightened by being less willing
to view women's submission within marriage as per se in the best interests of the family.
How women fared in reality cannot be assessed by focusing on
only a single sphere of transactions. Thus, in addition to conveyancing, Salmon focuses on divorce and separation provisions. Surprisingly, the Puritan colonies had the more liberal divorce laws. The
Puritans viewed marriage not as a sacrament but as a civil contract
and believed that "absolute divorces benefited society by dissolving '
dysfunctional unions" (p. 61). Absolute divorce was felt to be better
for society than a marriage wherein opposing interests were permitted
to clash. Thus, only in the New England colonies did lawmakers
break from the traditional English reluctance to grant absolute divorce, and Puritan women, at least, were not legally trapped in cruel,
abusive, or tyrannical marriages. While divorce was not as easily obtained in the southern colonies and New York, the chancery courts in
these jurisdictions administered legal separations. This resource was
not available to the reform colonies.
Once married, women resorted to divorce and separation only infrequently, but "[the] legal subjugation of the wife was intolerable to
many prospective wives and their fathers." 8 Thus, where equity jurisdiction existed, the lawyer's office was a frequent stop on the way to
the altar. Here, women sought to create property rights as yet unrecognized in common law and which could be enforced only in chancery
courts. The mechanisms they created and sought to enforce included:
premarital contracts which gave exclusive control of certain property
to the wife during the marriage; "separate estate[s] in equity" (trusts,
set up by the wife's family, of which she was the sole beneficiary); and
mandatory contractual agreements between husband and wife
whereby part of his estatejure uxoris was pledged to the support of the
wife and could not be conveyed by him. 9
Over time, the flexibility of the chancery courts and their use of
English precedent allowed states with separate equity jurisdiction to
enforce separate estates and antenuptial contracts for women and
thereby protect wives' property from their husbands' creditors. The
law in those states, according to Salmon, evolved to protect married
women "as the financial prospects of their husbands became increasingly unstable" (p. 83).
On the other hand, neither Massachusetts nor Connecticut enforced separate estates, and the single most important reason for this
8. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 3, at 531.
9. Id.
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failure was the absence of chancery courts in these jurisdictions (p.
120). The Puritans' aversion to equity courts caused them to create a
"truncated equity jurisdiction" (p. 121) which incorporated, piece by
piece, certain claims and causes of action into their common law
courts. Salmon documents how this piecemeal approach, combined
with an ideology which viewed a woman's autonomy as threatening to
the family, shaped the law regarding separate trust estates.
Finally, Salmon deals at length with economic provisions for widows. Because of the pervasive system of enforced dependency documented elsewhere in the book, this was a pressing concern for women.
Once a woman's source of support had vanished, it was crucial that
the law provide her enough of her husband's property to maintain a
decent lifestyle. Salmon shows just how inadequately the law met this
need.
The traditional provision of dower, a life interest in one-third of
the real property owned by the husband during any time in the marriage, was both an absolute right and a floor below which any alternate
provisions for the widow - including testamentary provisions could not fall. So inviolate was the right to dower that it prompted
one jurist in 1810 to declare: "the common by-word in the law [is]
that the law favors three things, life, liberty, and dower" (p. 145). As
a life interest only, however, dower did not give the widow the right to
alienate the property she received, but only to enjoy its rent and profits
for her lifetime. On her death, it descended automatically to her husband's children. Thus, dower reflected an ideal in colonial thought: it
provided immediate support to the widow but did not allow for her
independence (p. 143).
Perhaps more than any other area of the law, the rules of inheritance were subject to regional variations. Social, demographic, and
economic conditions of the earliest colonial settlements laid the foundation for these differences. The early plantation societies suffered
from high mortality rates, and men often died young, leaving behind
young widows with children. Unless slaves and personal property
were included in dower, these widows would be unable to manage the
plantation, and their share of their husbands' real property would be
meaningless, as no profits could flow from its use. In New England,
however, the presence of slaves was not a factor in the development of
inheritance provisions. New England widows, older and more likely
to have grown children than those in the plantation societies, were
expected to rely on their children for support. The Puritan ideal of
family unity and interdependence reinforced this expectation. Thus,
their dower consisted of only real property. Once again, however, reality conflicted with ideals to the detriment of women in less than ideal
family situations, and the reality of this forced dependence was
shocking:
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Far too often impoverished widows without family connections simply could not get along. They needed public assistance. In many communities, widows and single women living alone constituted the largest
segment of recipients of poor relief. They turned up in almshouses as
well. [p. 184]

The enforced dependency of widows (p. 183) on the charity of their
children, families, and community was inevitable because the law denied widows the property and the control over it they needed to maintain their standard of living once their husbands died.
Salmon ends her analysis of statutes, case law, and writings by noting that women's dissatisfaction with the scheme of property rights
men had provided them began to express itself in a variety of ways by
the end of the period from 1750 to 1830. Demonstrations of their discontent ranged from refusals to marry to insistence on premarital contracts to resort to equitable mechanisms to create and enforce separate
estates. By the middle of the nineteenth century, significant numbers
of women were pressing for passage of the married women's property
acts and for inheritance reforms that would increase their financial
independence. Finally, Salmon foreshadows women's monumental
drive for that most fundamental "compliance with the ideals of the
Revolution" (p. 193), the vote.
Thus, the complexity of married women's property rights during
the late colonial and early national periods becomes clear: legal devices available to women in some colonies and states were not available to their sisters in others. Colonial ideology created a diverse,
often paradoxical scheme of statutes and case law, at once liberal and
conservative, progressive and regressive, egalitarian and patriarchal.
It is a tribute to Marylynn Salmon's research and analysis that this
book is often frustrating and infuriating to read. On one level this is
because the development of the law was so painfully slow. Old legal
concepts such as unity of person died hard - impeding expansions in
women's autonomy that were otherwise consistent with the changing
American economy, changing attitudes toward women, and the maturing of republican ideals by the mid-nineteenth century. On another
level, the book is frustrating because the values Salmon documents are
so objectionable to present-day notions of women's role in society, and
it is easy to lose patience with ideas so rooted in ignorance and chauvinism and with theories that deny people the basic dignity of being
treated as individuals.
This book will likely prove an important contribution to the fields
of social and legal history and women's studies as a whole. It will also
be interesting to see how more judgmental historians will use the injus-
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tices Salmon documents to judge our colonial forefathers and religious
patriarchs.

- David H. Bromfield

